Criticism, if not as the foundation of creation, is worthless

(translated from my Chinese blog)

This is my new project, “Nietzschean Philology”. In each installment, I’ll read a passage from Nietzsche’s original writings. By practicing text analysis, we can enhance our ability to understand the world.

The reading of "We Philologists" continues. As the second part of the chapter "The Philologists," Nietzsche shifts from general critique to specific case studies. Sections 53-57 focus on the 17th-century philologist Bentley, analyzing Bentley's gifts, limitations, and achievements, as Nietzsche warns every individual aspiring to cultural creation: one must force oneself to shift from critique to creation.

53. Friedrich August Wolf reminds us how apprehensive and feeble were the first steps taken by our ancestors in moulding scholarship--how even the Latin classics, for example, had to be smuggled into the university market under all sorts of pretexts, as if they had been contraband goods. In the "Gottingen Lexicon" of 1737, J. M. Gesner tells us of the Odes of Horace: "ut imprimis, quid prodesse in severioribus studiis possint, ostendat."

54. I was pleased to read of Bentley "non tam grande pretium emendatiunculis meis statuere soleo, ut singularem aliquam gratiam inde sperem aut exigam."

Newton was surprised that men like Bentley and Hare should quarrel about a book of ancient comedies, since they were both theological dignitaries.

55. Horace was summoned by Bentley as before a judgment seat, the authority of which he would have been the first to repudiate. The admiration which a discriminating man acquires as a philologist is in proportion to the rarity of the discrimination to be found in philologists. Bentley's treatment of Horace has something of the schoolmaster about it It would appear at first sight as if Horace himself were not the object of discussion, but rather the various scribes and commentators who have handed down the text: in reality, however, it is actually Horace who is being dealt with. It is my firm conviction that to have written a single line which is deemed worthy of being commented upon by scholars of a later time, far outweighs the merits of the greatest critic.

There is a profound modesty about philologists. The improving of texts is an entertaining piece of work for scholars, it is a kind of riddle-solving; but it should not be looked upon as a very important task. It would be an argument against antiquity if it should speak less clearly to us because a million words stood in the way! 

56. A school-teacher said to Bentley, "Sir, I will make your grandchild as great a scholar as you are yourself." "How can you do that," replied Bentley, "when I have forgotten more than you ever knew?"

57. Bentley's clever daughter Joanna once lamented to her father that he had devoted his time and talents to the criticism of the works of others instead of writing something original. Bentley remained silent for some time as if he were turning the matter over in his mind. At last he said that her remark was quite right; he himself felt that he might have directed his gifts in some other channel. Earlier in life, nevertheless, he had done something for the glory of God and the improvement of his fellow-men (referring to his "Confutation of Atheism"), but afterwards the genius of the pagans had attracted him, and, _despairing of attaining their level in any other way_, he had mounted upon their shoulders so that he might thus be able to look over their heads.

"We Philologists", Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by J. M. Kennedy 

This section begins with specific case studies, rather than just vaguely criticizing philologists. Nietzsche's main cases to critique are Bentley and Wolf. This article will first handle Bentley's case, and the next one will cover Wolf.

But before entering Bentley, Nietzsche first told a story: Actually, when the entire cultural facility now called "academic institutions" (including the human cargo yard, i.e., scholars, literature, research sites) was first established, that is, in medieval Europe, research had to be conducted secretly like smuggling. This section sets the overall tone for sections 53~62: the starting point of academia is a spineless, subservient state, having to take orders from the face of theology. Whether it's Bentley or Wolf, they all had to study against this backdrop. Understanding these two people requires considering social pressure.

Under the stern gaze of theology, ancient classics could at most be praised for the greatness of God through the mouths of pagans; in a cultural sphere heavily controlled by ideology, any research must prove its obedience and usefulness to the regime to survive. (A laughable example is "Confucian Marxism.")

Bentley could not escape this social pressure either. He also had to rise to the top of the theological world to gain a certain cultural voice before he could possibly "dance with chains on." Nietzsche's attitude toward Bentley was quite complex. On the one hand, he thought Bentley could have done better, for example, not treating the Roman poet Horace with the attitude of a schoolmaster, not focusing his main energy on annotations and critiques of the ancients, but engaging more in independent creative work (Nietzsche had full confidence in Bentley's creativity); on the other hand, Nietzsche knew that Bentley probably had little more space to "do better," because any violation of church rules and the spirit of the age could bring him ruin.

Nowadays, anyone who aspires to cultural creation cannot help but feel the dual pressure of the market economy and academic institutions: either enter the marketplace of ideas, competing with various sensationalists who "die without making a stunning statement" and various conspiracy theorists who sensationalize, for the sake of voice; or enter the academic market, accepting all the demands and disciplines of academic institutions towards themselves (such as academic writing norms, publication requirements, teaching requirements, administrative department requirements, private demands of superiors, and so on) in exchange for a place in academia, obtaining access to professional resources and field qualification. Either path is suffocating to original creative motivation; you have to please one side, either the market's consumer public or the academic professional class. In some places, you also have to constantly please the ruling elite. In a sense, the situation of contemporary intellectuals is perhaps even worse than that of the ancient times.

Modern intellectuals face an extra inherent pressure, particularly evident in Bentley: whether to pursue independent creation or to engage in the task of criticizing predecessors' works in a derivative manner? Nietzsche said the former is far greater than the latter. A single timeless utterance surpasses the work of the greatest critic in a lifetime. But today, the motivation for criticism is far stronger than the motivation for original creation. Look at the comment section to see this. I have asked commenters repeatedly: who are you, what are your own pursuits. Don't stay stuck on criticism, criticism is always cheap. The grandmas in the vegetable market know how to criticize the vendors. The problem is what after the criticism? What has your criticism brought you? Do you have new insights? Have you taken action? If not, your criticism isn't just a passing fancy?

I felt very ashamed and uncomfortable when I read this passage myself. I often feel a lack of courage to create original work, only able to engage with Nietzsche and those cultural giants by picking up others' ideas. I rely on reading others' words to enrich myself. But criticism itself is meaningless. Criticism must become the foundation for creation, otherwise it is worthless. It was out of this realization that Nietzsche shifted from being a philologist to philosophical creation, and a new type of aphoristic writing. One must force oneself to turn from criticism to creation.

The tragedy of Bentley lies in the fact that he indeed had the ability to create, but on one hand, he was constrained by social pressure, and on the other hand, he avoided the obligation of creation in his own heart (the obligation to realize his self-actualization), as a result, he only knew criticism and annotation throughout his life and did not leave behind any immortal words.