I prefer straightforward and simple people

(translated from my Chinese blog)

This is my new project, “Nietzschean Philology”. In each installment, I’ll read a passage from Nietzsche’s original writings. By practicing text analysis, we can enhance our ability to understand the world.

The reading of "We Philologists" continues. Sections 40-45 are Nietzsche's genealogical sketch of the evolution of values ​​from ancient to modern times. The first half of this process (40-42) has been introduced earlier. This article enters the second half (43-45), from the humanism of the Renaissance to the humanitarianism after the Reformation, and then to Wagner and Schopenhauer's modern interpretation of ancient innocence and straightforwardness. From this, Nietzsche has sorted out three major threads hidden in the torrent of history: humanity, humanism, and humanitarianism, and hinted at a grand story of intercultural struggle.

43. It is true that both humanism and rationalism have brought antiquity into the field as an ally; and it is therefore quite comprehensible that the opponents of humanism should direct their attacks against antiquity also. Antiquity, however, has been misunderstood and falsified by humanism · it must rather be considered as a testimony against humanism, against the benign nature of man, &c. The opponents of humanism are wrong to combat antiquity as well; for in antiquity they have a strong ally.

44. It is so difficult to understand the ancients. We must wait patiently until the spirit moves us. The human element which antiquity shows us must not be confused with humanitarianism. This contrast must be strongly emphasised: philology suffers by endeavouring to substitute the humanitarian, young men are brought forward as students of philology in order that they may thereby become humanitarians. A good deal of history, in my opinion, is quite sufficient for that purpose. The brutal and self-conscious man will be humbled when he sees things and values changing to such an extent. The human element among the Greeks lies within a certain naiveté, through which man himself is to be seen--state, art, society, military and civil law, sexual relations, education, party. It is precisely the human element which may be seen everywhere and among all peoples, but among the Greeks it is seen in a state of nakedness and inhumanity which cannot be dispensed with for purposes of instruction. In addition to this, the Greeks have created the greatest number of individuals, and thus they give us so much insight into men,--a Greek cook is more of a cook than any other.

45. I deplore a system of education which does not enable people to understand Wagner, and as the result of which Schopenhauer sounds harsh and discordant in our ears . such a system of education has missed its aim.

"We Philologists", Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by J. M. Kennedy 

The text focused on in the previous article (sections 40~42) has introduced the first half of the evolution of Western values, from the pre-Socratic era up to the Renaissance and the Reformation. Sections 43~45 continue this topic, from Renaissance humanism to post-Reformation humanism, and finally to Wagner and Schopenhauer in the 19th century, the two masters whom Nietzsche, during his Basel period, regarded as the true revival of the "factors of humanity" (Nietzsche later lost favor with both).

Parallel to this timeline is Nietzsche's presentation of two attitudes toward history, or two "ancient perspectives." Thus, history is not a process of a single main thread unfolding, but rather a process where two or even multiple threads intertwine. Some of these threads are in the open (the "dominant" culture), while others are in the shadows (the "opposition" culture), constantly engaging in strategic play and vying for the discourse of the era as history progresses. On the other hand, history is not determined materially by one or multiple objective factors, because people's understanding of history in an era can, in turn, influence their decisions and strategic play, thereby shaping that era. Therefore, history is neither a simple summation nor a cause-and-effect inference, but rather a multiplication of the contemporary and its multiple histories—a product of the contemporary looking back at ancient, classical, medieval, modern, etc., that is, a dialogue with all these histories. Such a historical dialogue is always open and unpredictable.

On the surface, humanism and humanitarianism have many overlaps, but in Nietzsche's view, their core principles differ greatly. First, Nietzsche believed that both humanism and humanitarianism are misinterpretations of antiquity. Humanism merely mistakes classical culture (literature, sculpture, philosophy, etc.) for the entirety of antiquity, though it is a biased generalization, it still preserves the ancient pursuit of excellence; whereas humanitarianism is a comprehensive softening of antiquity, the pursuit and respect for excellence have vanished, leaving only calls for equality, emphasis on compassion and mercy, and praise for the ordinary and even the mediocre.

Humanism believes in the nobility and perfection of human beings, believing that "human nature is inherently good," and uses the great figures of antiquity as evidence. But Nietzsche said that the world of ancient people actually proved that human nature is not inherently good but inherently evil. In the values of modern people, antiquity is seen as inhumane: universal slavery, severe punishments, rampant private punishments, physical injuries and harm to life are everywhere, and the principle of "an eye for an eye" is considered the norm. This is in terms of society. Only in terms of individuals, heroes often treat the lives of common people as grass, Hannibal, when seeking to revitalize Carthage and destroy Rome, of course, would not consider how many lives would be harmed in the war, let alone whether the slaves in the Spanish colonies were living comfortably and happily. The nobility and greatness of ancient heroes were based on the lives of countless nameless soldiers, as the saying goes, "One general's success is built on ten thousand corpses." To modern people, this is evil, but to ancient people, it's nothing about good or bad, it's just strength. Ancients only distinguished between good and bad based on strength or weakness, not on morality for good and evil, which might be Nietzsche's most radical and important intellectual contribution: evil does not objectively exist, it's invented in specific historical contexts.

Humanitarianism's misinterpretation of antiquity is more severe than that of humanism, precisely because humanism introduces moral factors into the understanding of antiquity. Humanism is the aestheticization of antiquity, while humanitarianism is the moralization of antiquity, more accurately, the moral transformation according to Christian ethics. Thus, the order of antiquity is completely inverted: historically, Jesus and his followers were in underground conditions for a long time, illegal cult organizations within the Roman Empire, but under humanitarian understanding, the early church became a beacon of that era, with the surrounding "pagans" becoming figures of darkness or evil. If a person were placed back in that era, no one could have predicted that Christianity would eventually become the orthodox faith of the Roman Empire, so what reason would there be for people living in that era to view the world through the lens of a cult's concepts of good and evil?

Even Jesus himself may not be as humane as people say, because he also said, "Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I came to set a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a person's enemies will be those of his own household." (Matthew 10:34-36)

Let us call Nietzsche's proposed true understanding of antiquity "humanity," which genuinely acknowledges human nature and accepts various manifestations of human behavior without preconceptions. Nietzsche actually demonstrates the struggle process of three understandings (ancient humanity, Renaissance-invented humanism, and Protestant-invented humanitarianism) as three historical threads, resembling the overthrow of a sitting ruler by a new challenger in politics, i.e., a regime change. But Nietzsche was probably also aware that his proposed "humanity" was likely not a faithful restoration of the ancients, but merely another invention and creation, hence he also said that "it is so difficult to understand the ancients." Humanism is not a counterattack or restoration of ancient culture, but rather a rebellion of a new cultural paradigm against modern culture, a "cultural revolution."

The beginning of section 44 is a satire of Christianity, particularly Protestant ethics:

We must wait patiently until the spirit moves us.

The two major tenets of the Reformation were first, reclaiming the authority to interpret the Bible from the Roman Church and returning it to all people, known as "Sola Scriptura"; and second, denying all external, secular efforts at redemption, asserting that humans are completely powerless in their own salvation and can only obey God's grace, known as "Sola Gratia." The first tenet led clergy to learn a whole set of textual analysis techniques from the "poeticians-literary scholars" of the Renaissance (or, both belong to the same intellectual lineage), representing the rational aspect (rationalism) of the Reformation; the second tenet led to an emphasis on the Holy Spirit and grace, positioning individuals in an absolutely powerless state before the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God, who could only passively accept God's will, representing the sensual (humanism) aspect of the Reformation. From the ancient Greeks' belief that truth was revealed (disclosure), to Christianity transforming it into revelation theology, to the Reformation delegating the authority of truth or revelation from the Pope to every individual's heart, what originally belonged to external authority became subjective and internal.

But Nietzsche turned this understanding upside down once again: what you call the touch of the Holy Spirit actually originates in antiquity; you should not listen to the voice of your own heart (dubbed "the Holy Spirit"), but to the cries of the ancients. Nietzsche wanted to re-establish an external authority of humanity, taking the great figures of antiquity as models. Modern people should learn to revere the giants again, rather than adopting a cynical, mocking frivolous attitude to dissolve everything. Yet, ironically, it was Nietzsche's genealogical method and the undermining of modern values that provided powerful tools for later schools (especially postmodernism) to dissolve all concepts. It seems we can no longer learn to admire anything, because we are too accustomed to deconstructing everything.

Finally, about the naiveté of the ancient Greeks, and the issue of Wagner and Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's so-called naiveté is, of course, far removed from the innocence implied today. What he meant was that the ancient Greeks possessed a remarkable quality—they tended to open up and reveal everything they did without reservation. They had a candidness about them, and everything cultural they invented or borrowed is "what it is": the state existed merely as a state, neither overstepping society nor evading its duties; art pursued its essence and purpose, and then sought the highest art in accordance with its essence; parties existed as "parts" of citizens (party derives from part), neither claiming to represent "the whole people" nor avoiding the interests of the citizens they did represent. The saying that "a Greek cook is more of a cook than any other" simply means that a Greek cook fully and honestly fulfills the duties of a cook. In line with a cook's "nature," rather than playing music while cooking, as is seen in many distasteful "music restaurants" today, which is quite out of place. This naiveté of the ancient Greeks is closely related to their understanding that everything has a nature. It is precisely for this reason that we have learned a nature from them, and also learned that this nature is ultimately just one of countless interpretations, that is, there is no nature at all. This brings us back to Goethe's quote: the ancients are always the despair of the emulator.

In Nietzsche's view at that time, Wagner and Schopenhauer were modern interpretations of the naiveté and straightforwardness of the ancients: daring to speak the harsh truth, daring to compose artistic works that challenge social norms. To challenge modernity directly, rather than being oblique in pleasing modern people. This makes one think of Nietzsche's distinction between the warrior personality and the prophet personality. In my opinion, the greatest difference between the warrior and the prophet lies in the former's rough straightforwardness, while the latter is always oblique, eloquent, always scheming, full of hidden motives, and every word has an implied meaning. The warrior personality says what they want to say and mean what they mean, no need for disguise or concealment, ultimately speaking with strength; the prophet personality knows they lack strength, so they must rely heavily on language, rituals, and symbols to enchant the masses and gain their power. Nietzsche's Übermensch image attempts to combine the two personalities, having both the warrior's straightforwardness and strength, as well as the prophet's cunning and charm. But whether this combination is possible, and whether it would even qualify as an Übermensch if it succeeded, remain highly questionable. In terms of interpersonal relationships, I still prefer straightforward and simple people.