The deeper one delves into history, the harder it becomes to maintain the preference for antiquity

(translated from my Chinese blog)

This is my new project, “Nietzschean Philology”. In each installment, I’ll read a passage from Nietzsche’s original writings. By practicing text analysis, we can enhance our ability to understand the world.

The reading of "We Philologists" continues. In the previous section, Nietzsche proposed that philologists maintain their lofty social status by calculating and exploiting social prejudices. The following sections (29-30) discuss what these prejudices are and why they have become increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of historical and linguistic advancements, and why the class of philologists is in peril.

29. It is difficult to justify the preference for antiquity since it has arisen from prejudices:

1. From ignorance of other antiquity.

2. From a false idealisation of humanitarianism, whilst Hindoos and Chinese are at all events more humane.

3. From the pretensions of school-teachers.

4. From the traditional admiration which emanated from antiquity itself.

5. From opposition to the Christian church; or as a support for this church.

6. From the impression created by the century-long work of the philologists, and the nature of this work. It must be a gold mine, thinks the spectator.

7. The acquirement of knowledge attained as the result of the study. The preparatory school of science.

In short, partly from ignorance, wrong impressions, and misleading conclusions; and also from the interest which philologists have in raising their science to a high level in the estimation of laymen.

Also the preference for antiquity on the part of the artists, who involuntarily assume proportion and moderation to be the property of all antiquity. Purity of form. Authors likewise.

The preference for antiquity as an abbreviation of the history of the human race, as if there were an autochthonous creation here by which all becoming might be studied.

The fact actually is that the foundations of this preference are being removed one by one, and if this is not remarked by philologists themselves, it is certainly being remarked as much as it can possibly be by people outside their circle. First of all history had its effect, and then linguistics brought about the greatest diversion among philologists themselves, and even the desertion of many of them. They have still the schools in their hands: but for how long! In the form in which it has existed up to the present philology is dying out; the ground has been swept from under its feet. Whether philologists may still hope to maintain their status is doubtful; in any case they are a dying race.

30. The peculiarly significant situation of philologists: a class of people to whom we entrust our youth, and who have to investigate quite a special antiquity. The highest value is obviously attached to this antiquity. But if this antiquity has been wrongly valued, then the whole foundation upon which the high position of the philologist is based suddenly collapses. In any case this antiquity has been very differently valued, and our appreciation of the philologists has constantly been guided by it. These people have borrowed their power from the strong prejudices in favour of antiquity,--this must be made clear.

Philologists now feel that when these prejudices are at last refuted, and antiquity depicted in its true colours, the favourable prejudices towards them will diminish considerably. It is thus to the interest of their profession not to let a clear impression of antiquity come to light; in particular the impression that antiquity in its highest sense renders one "out of season?" i.e., an enemy to one's own time.

It is also to the interest of philologists as a class not to let their calling as teachers be regarded from a higher standpoint than that to which they themselves can correspond. 

"We Philologists", Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by J. M. Kennedy 

First, Nietzsche lists seven prejudices that make it difficult to justify the worship of the past, and since these prejudices (for some reason) are fading, the philological class is in danger.

Second, the question of the interests of the philological class. Nietzsche seems to have more to say about this, possibly because as a professor of philology, he has witnessed the various hypocritical actions this class has taken to prolong its existence.

Let's first look at the seven prejudices. Nietzsche seems to attribute these prejudices to "ignorance, wrong impressions, and misleading conclusions." Approximately, 1 is ignorance, 2 and 6 are illusions, and 3, 4, 5, and 7 are misguidance. However, if we delve deeper, these prejudices have complex internal connections.

For example (1) "ignorance of other antiquity," where "other antiquity" could refer to either the ancient times (pre-Socratic era) or the medieval times (Middle Ages), and the two answers would point in very different directions, each with its own arguments. Previously, Nietzsche had hinted that the Greek three philosophers or the "Golden Age" was far from the most vital and creative period of the ancient Greeks, but rather the beginning of their decline. The true era of "giants" was the pre-Socratic period, when the ancient Greeks had not yet developed a sense of history, and it was the chaotic era of the two giants, Parmenides and Heraclitus. So Nietzsche might be suggesting that "philology has not yet begun," because we must at least grasp the complete life cycle of a people before we can talk about understanding antiquity. In other words, antiquity should not be understood as the ephemeral birthplace of a great man, 'an autochthonous creation'; antiquity also has its context, and there must be another ancient viewed by the ancients. We need to excavate the historical factors behind antiquity, the foundational era that made antiquity brilliant. This is the real academic goal of philology. (At that point, philology will transform into genealogy.)

But if understood as ignorance of medieval times, it will be associated with (5) "opposition or support to the Christian Church." The Christian theory of original sin, or millenarianism, views the real world as a process that will only keep deteriorating until it is completely renewed by Christ's second coming. This teleology gives history direction and meaning, and provides a "metaphysical scheme" for classical studies, just as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment movement would use "revival" or "retrograde" as slogans, with the same implication: the history before this (the Middle Ages) is a process of continuous deterioration, and we must skip this history and return to a state of natural innocence.

However, once one sees (2) mentioning "Indians and Chinese," a third interpretive space emerges: the "other antiquity" here is most likely referring to "antiquity of other nations." Nietzsche has already completely stepped out of European history and is looking at the world as a whole to explore the ancient processes of all nations worldwide. He also prevents Eurocentrists from still advocating that ancient Greece and Rome are more sublime than ancient India and China, as he says, this view is nothing more than "the false idealization of humanitarianism," a product of the softening of Christian values, not the true image of ancient Greece and Rome. Today, we also have an impulse to idealize the ancient China, as Ge Zhaoguang said, "as if we have been very civilized since ancient times," no, at least in Nietzsche's view, any ancient times are unequal, cruel, and dangerous. After being immersed in the comfortable modern world for a long time, people forget this, thinking that ancient people also lived a worry-free life, always saying "thank you" and "pardon," and always considering the cost-effectiveness and return rate of everything. The ancients were not like this.

Thus, ignorance, wrong impressions, and misleading conclusions go hand in hand. For example, it is precisely due to ignorance that the spectator feel that under the ant-like excavation work of the philologists, "it must be a gold mine," but the cultural industry is full of lies and scams, full of secrets only known to practitioners. Moreover, once a discipline forms its own norms and operates in a systematic manner, others are more easily intimidated, Just like a Taoist priest's scribbled talismans and the pompous 'spirit-subduing' rituals, once you realize that the scribbled talismans are nothing more than an elaborately drawn 'Go away, evil spirits,' it becomes easy to get disenchanted from this set of tricks.

This raises the question of the social interests of philologists. For these interests, they certainly know the importance of maintaining their charm and will certainly do everything they can to prevent people from demystifying their work.

The profit motive is inherent in both the deception of the masses and the manipulation of truth. Since the manuscript of 1875, profit has begun to occupy a central place in Nietzsche's thought. It would be better to understand Nietzsche's "value" and "valuation" as profit. Nietzsche's revaluation of all values is to challenge the existing profit structure and strive for his own profit. Two sub-questions remain to be answered: why Nietzsche says that the prejudices that are beneficial to the philologist have gradually lost their foundation (and what does "history has its consequences" mean here)? And, what does Nietzsche mean by "regarded from a higher standpoint"?

On one hand, if "history" is understood as the narrow discipline of historiography, then the 19th century indeed witnessed multiple paradigm shifts in the field: the work of Mommsen and Eduard Meyer demonstrated that history could be re-examined from the perspective of the life cycle of nations, yielding a more interpretive narrative than the traditional linear view (ancient-classical-medieval-modern); archaeological and historical studies of various nations around the world shattered the originally Eurocentric concepts, broadening our perspective on the course of human development; questioning the classical "standard answers," ancient Greece and Rome ceased to serve as the benchmark for judgment, becoming subjects of study and questioning themselves, and the lofty status of the classical world increasingly wavered... All these are the consequences of "history" (historiography): the deeper the study of history, the more difficult it becomes to maintain the preference for antiquity that was originally held. It's as if the more deeply one understands a person, the more the original halo and filters gradually fade, and so one gradually recognizes the person's true nature, both good and bad, but no longer a fantastic, beautiful bubble.

Yet if "history" is interpreted as the entire past, things become more complicated: Nietzsche is likely implying that philologists maintain their interests by relying on historical inertia and social prejudices, which will eventually be pushed to a position no longer possible to maintain. In other words, the "sweetness" provided by habits can no longer overpower the "bitterness" brought by the shifting social prejudices and the exposure of truth. Humans are "beings-in-the-world" and cannot live in illusions for a long time. They must continuously adjust their beliefs and habits as the natural and historical environments change. Otherwise, they will face the same fate as the extinct nations in history, leading to the decline and even extinction of an entire nation or species. Therefore, history is like going against the tide, if you don't advance, you will regress. It's as if history has a "gravitational pull." If people don't keep striving, they will eventually fall into the abyss. At that time, if history is to be held accountable, the philologist class, or more broadly, the class of demagogues, will be the first to bear the historical blame.

The issue of "higher perspectives" follows. Nietzsche's point is that philologists are actually shooting the arrows first and then drawing the target around them. They first determine what they can achieve, i.e., the technical philological research results (determining the authenticity of texts, grammatical structure, historical details, etc.), and then claim that this is the value of philology, persuading others to accept this value judgment. Once people realize that they can examine the value of philology from a higher perspective, they will find that the work of contemporary philologists is so trivial and boring, that they waste such vast social resources to perform such petty tasks, and have such a bad influence on young people—what kind of bad influence, you might ask? Settling for mediocrity, believing that pursuing technical excellence is the essence of life's value, conforming, adding bricks to an already dead cultural industry, being weak, not daring to challenge authority, and withering prematurely.