We must speak the truth, and then burn ourselves

(translated from my Chinese blog)

This is my new project, “Nietzschean Philology”. In each installment, I’ll read a passage from Nietzsche’s original writings. By practicing text analysis, we can enhance our ability to understand the world.

The reading of "We Philologists" continues. As the conclusion of a chapter, section 46 provides a general summary of this chapter: from the question of the philologist's excessive control over social resources, to the diagnosis that the philologist either lacks understanding of antiquity, or modernity, or the self, Nietzsche finally returns to the issue of the life's task raised at the beginning of this book: the widespread lack of awareness of their own mission in academia is the root cause of the misalignment of education in our time.

46. (THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE FIRST CHAPTER.)

Il faut dire la vérité et s'immoler--VOLTAIRE.

Let us suppose that there were freer and more superior spirits who were dissatisfied with the education now in vogue, and that they summoned it to their tribunal, what would the defendant say to them? In all probability something like this: "Whether you have a right to summon anyone here or not, I am at all events not the proper person to be called. It is my educators to whom you should apply. It is their duty to defend me, and I have a right to keep silent. I am merely what they have made me."

These educators would now be hauled before the tribunal, and among them an entire profession would be observed · the philologists. This profession consists in the first place of those men who make use of their knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity to bring up youths of thirteen to twenty years of age, and secondly of those men whose task it is to train specially-gifted pupils to act as future teachers--i.e., as the educators of educators. Philologists of the first type are teachers at the public schools, those of the second are professors at the universities.

The first-named philologists are entrusted with the care of certain specially-chosen youths, those who, early in life, show signs of talent and a sense of what is noble, and whose parents are prepared to allow plenty of time and money for their education. If other boys, who do not fulfil these three conditions, are presented to the teachers, the teachers have the right to refuse them. Those forming the second class, the university professors, receive the young men who feel themselves fitted for the highest and most responsible of callings, that of teachers and moulders of mankind; and these professors, too, may refuse to have anything to do with young men who are not adequately equipped or gifted for the task.

If, then, the educational system of a period is condemned, a heavy censure on philologists is thereby implied: either, as the consequence of their wrong-headed view, they insist on giving bad education in the belief that it is good; or they do not wish to give this bad education, but are unable to carry the day in favour of education which they recognise to be better. In other words, their fault is either due to their lack of insight or to their lack of will. In answer to the first charge they would say that they knew no better, and in answer to the second that they could do no better. As, however, these philologists bring up their pupils chiefly with the aid of Greek and Roman antiquity, their want of insight in the first case may be attributed to the fact that they do not understand antiquity, and again to the fact that they bring forward antiquity into the present age as if it were the most important of all aids to instruction, while antiquity, generally speaking, does not assist in training, or at all events no longer does so.

On the other hand, if we reproach our professors with their lack of will, they would be quite right in attributing educational significance and power to antiquity; but they themselves could not be said to be the proper instruments by means of which antiquity could exhibit such power. In other words, the professors would not be real teachers and would be living under false colours, but how, then, could they have reached such an irregular position? Through a misunderstanding of themselves and their qualifications. In order, then, that we may ascribe to philologists their share in this bad educational system of the present time, we may sum up the different factors of their innocence and guilt in the following sentence: the philologist, if he wishes for a verdict of acquittal, must understand three things antiquity, the present time, and himself · his fault lies in the fact that he either does not understand antiquity, or the present time, or himself.

"We Philologists", Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by J. M. Kennedy 

This is the "FINAL DRAFT OF THE FIRST CHAPTER," according to the planning of this unfinished book as outlined in Section 26 "PLANS AND THOUGHTS RELATING TO A WORK ON PHILOLOGY," this chapter is an exposition of philological problems ("How did philology gain such power? Through calculation and the exploitation of various biases") and a deduction ("Once biases are dispelled, philology becomes redundant"), so Sections 27~46 can be seen as the complete drafts that Nietzsche wrote for this first chapter, and this 46th section is a summary of this chapter.

What fascinates me most about Nietzsche's line of thought in this section is that he doesn't seem to intend to morally critique the philologists. His point is that, in fact, these philologists don't really know what the world is like, and if we accept "ignorance is no sin," then these philologists are no wiser than the common crowd about their own historical situation, to put it bluntly, just a bunch of muggles. Muggles are muggles, you can't blame muggles for not understanding magic. Of course, the moral issue here is far more complex than just calling someone a "muggle," because muggles are defined as being born with it, but the pursuit of knowledge is, by definition, a learned process. For example, does a person buying an appliance have a responsibility to read the manual and ensure proper use? If they fail to fulfill this responsibility to obtain necessary information and cause a fire that affects neighbors, can they claim "I didn't know this appliance can't be used like this" to avoid blame? If at this lower technical level, we believe a modern person has a great responsibility to seek knowledge, then at a higher moral or existential level, a person should also have a responsibility for self-awakening, right?

So, Nietzsche said, a philologist must prove his innocence by proving he understands antiquity, modernity, and himself. As a philologist, who claims to be qualified to educate all of humanity, as the "educator of educators," his ignorance of these three areas is clear evidence of his guilt. The premise that the ignorant are blameless, as Aristotle said, is that they cannot seek knowledge. Of course, you can't blame a child from a poor farming family for not understanding the various facilities in a big city; he doesn't have the conditions. But since you, philologists, have already secured an advantage in social resources, with such favorable conditions, you have no reason to excuse yourselves for being ignorant or incompetent. And incompetence is ultimately a form of ignorance, because of a lack of self-awareness of one's own capabilities, so blindly accepting the high status society gives you leads to a situation where your virtue does not match your position, and finally, on the historical judgment bench, you lament "I am powerless"—this is not incompetence, but ignorance.

Nietzsche's awareness of the issue remains closely tied to the theme of education. Moreover, quite unusually, he expressed some views on the profession of teacher. Here, the teacher refers to the ordinary teachers in public schools. The original text Gymnasien refers to the German secondary schools, roughly corresponding to China's general secondary schools, distinguished from vocational schools. Nietzsche said that only young people with "special talents" are suitable for being trained to become future teachers. Today's requirements for teachers, despite having been lowered to what can be called a mediocre level due to the needs of national development and the popularization of education, for example, it seems that no one thinks that normal schools and normal majors need students with particularly high levels (the enrollment scores of these schools and majors are not as high as those of finance or mechanical and electrical engineering, and with the annual decline in birth rates, the value of normal majors is still declining), but our society seems to have some special requirements for teachers, on the one hand, moral requirements, on the other hand, technical requirements, that is, the requirement to improve exam scores. If test scores could accurately reflect students' competence, regarding Chinese language, as the ability to use language and characters, that would be acceptable; but who makes the tests? Chinese language experts; what purpose would they have in making what kind of tests? Of course, to do everything they can control, within their professional field, with a certain level of differentiation to meet the screening needs of the state machine. This is what Nietzsche said earlier, that philologists first shoot arrows and then draw the target, first see what they are most proficient in, and then decide what students should learn, rather than the other way around: first consider what should be taught, and then dedicate themselves to researching and mastering it.

At the end of this section, Nietzsche returned to the question of life's mission, saying that philologists were unworthy of their position because they "misperceived themselves and their lifes' calling." This brought back the issue from the first section: the vast majority of people lack awareness of their life's mission. But what he was attacking were not the mediocre and ineffective people, but the top-tier professors who were considered very successful and highly respected by secular standards. Nietzsche meant that simply because one is doing well in a certain position, receiving praise and adoration from the whole society, does not mean one is self-actualized. Because, from a longer historical perspective, the more successful one is in a time of black and white reversal, the further one actually strays from the wrong path. Lacking reflection on one's own era (not understanding modern times), lacking an understanding of historical evolution (not understanding ancient times), ultimately also means lacking an understanding of oneself and one's own mission (not understanding oneself).

The so-called self-mission, Nietzsche never explicitly stated, but at least it can be certain that it was never about submitting to some external order or objective laws (Hegelian freedom), nor was it about the vulgar phrases like "living brilliantly" or "enjoying life." The self-mission must always be dangerous, always related to the era's propositions, and always related to a person's gifts and circumstances. After understanding historical evolution and modern dilemmas, and also clarifying the historical burdens from various eras within oneself and "knowing oneself," a person may find a "belonging only to me" position in the contemporary era, as if the entire history and surroundings were all for the purpose of leading me to that position, as if I were standing at the pinnacle of history, both holding the opportunity to create new heights and facing the danger of falling into an abyss at any moment. Therefore, although Nietzsche had implicitly mocked Voltaire for his modern stance earlier, at the end of the first chapter, Nietzsche still quoted Voltaire with respect:

We must speak the truth, and then burn ourselves.